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Plaintiff/Appellant William V. Penney ("Penney") hereby 
submits the following Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant. All 
references "R." are to the district court record. 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(k) and Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 42. This case was poured-over to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by order the Utah Supreme Court dated June 3, 1993. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Summary judgment by the trial court. Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Because a summary judgment resolves only questions of law, the 
appellate court is to give no deference to the trial court's 
determination. In reviewing an entry of summary judgment, the 
appellate court is to view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the opposing party and affirm only where it appears no genuine 
dispute exists as to any material fact, and where the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Druffner v. 
Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075 (Utah App. 1992); Johnson v. 
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Utah 1991); New 
West Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guardian Title Co., 818 P.2d 585, 
588 (Utah App. 1991). Where a party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment timely presents his affidavit stating reasons 
why he is presently unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits, he 
directly and forthrightly invokes the trial courts discretion. 
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Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should be 
liberally treated. Exercising a sound discretion the trial court 
then determines whether the stated reasons are adequate. Cox v. 
Winters. 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students 
of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule, or 
regulation necessarily is determinative of this appeal. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies, however, to the Court's 
appellate decision. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
Plaintiff William V. Penney ("Penney") was wrongfully 
terminated by defendants on June 18, 1986, after more than five 
(5) years of continuous exemplary employment with defendant 
E-Systems' Montek Division in the State of Utah. Penney, as an 
employee, had rights to not be discriminated against because of 
his disabilities, not to be fired when he refused to engage in or 
keep quiet about illegal acts involving his employer and its 
management, to be dealt with in good faith, to have his 
employment contract faithfully performed by his employer, and not 
to have his employer or its management intentionally inflict 
emotional distress upon Penney. Penney commenced this action to 
recover damages for his wrongful termination and for defendants' 
violation and breach of each of the enumerated rights. 
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Course of Proceedings Below 
Penney filed his verified complaint ("Verified Complaint") 
in this action about June 15, 1990 for judgment against 
defendants on 5 causes of action (I. Discrimination against 
Disabled; II. Fraudulent & Dishonest Acts; III. Covenant of Good 
Faith & Fair Dealing; IV. Breach of Contract; V. Infliction of 
Emotional Distress). Defendants filed an Answer about August 2, 
1990, more than 45 days after the Verified Complaint was filed 
and served on defendants. 
About July 11, 1990 Penney served upon defendants 
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories and Request For 
Production Of Documents. On September 26, 1990, defendants 
responded to Penney7s 1st Set of Interrogatories & Request For 
Production of Documents, more than 60 days after the 
interrogatories were served on defendants. On October 2, 1990, 
Penney noticed up the depositions of defendants David A. Williams 
and Alfred B. Buchanan. Neither of these depositions were ever 
taken because of scheduling objections of defendants and their 
counsel. 
On July 11, 1990 Penney answered defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of Documents. 
Subsequently Defendants noticed up the deposition of Penney. 
Penney's counsel agreed to the taking of Penney's deposition 
subject to scheduling (mornings only) that would protect 
Penney's health, not impair his recovery from injury and 
consequent surgeries and allow him to be clear headed enough to 
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understand and answer d e p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n s . The promise of 
mornings o n l y was not k e p t . Penney was pushed beyond h i s 
p h y s i c a l and mental l i m i t s w h i l e b e i n g s u b j e c t e d t o 2 1/2 f u l l 
days of g r u e l i n g i n t e r r o g a t i o n , which Penney was a b l e t o endure 
o n l y by t h e u s e of s t r o n g p r e s c r i p t i o n p a i n m e d i c a t i o n which 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d P e n n e y , s a b i l i t y t o unders tand and answer 
d e p o s i t i o n q u e s t i o n s . 
About September 2 4 , 1991 d e f e n d a n t s s e r v e d t h e i r MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, on Penney 
s e e k i n g d i s m i s s a l of c a u s e s I , I I I , IV, IV, and V of t h e V e r i f i e d 
Complaint . D e f e n d a n t s ' Motion was granted by t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t s Order dated J u l y 10 , 1 9 9 2 . l 
About August 3 , 1992, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s e r v e d on Penney a 
s c h e d u l i n g order r e q u i r i n g a l l d i s c o v e r y t o be comple te by 
December 1, 1992, and " a l l d e p o s i t i v e mot ions t o be heard by Jan 
4 , 1 9 9 2 . " [ s i c ] 
About December 3 1 , 1992, d e f e n d a n t s mai l ed t o Penney 
d e f e n d a n t s ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, t o g e t h e r w i t h 
d e f e n d a n t s ' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS7 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, s e e k i n g d i s m i s s a l of cause I I , t h e o n l y 
1
 On June 18, 1992, Penney, an o u t - o f - s t a t e l i t i g a n t res id ing more than 
1,000 miles away in Texas who had undergone major surgeries on 11/13/91 and 
3/10/92 and was s t i l l convalescing therefrom, requested the d i s t r i c t court t o 
postpone a hearing on defendants' Motion For Part ia l Summary Judgment se t for 
6/19/1992. The ONLY bas i s given by the d i s t r i c t court in i t s July 10, 1992 Order 
re j ec t ing Penney's request was "(1) p l a i n t i f f i s now representing himself; (2) 
p l a i n t i f f has not requested addit ional time to re ta in other counsel; and (3) 
there i s no indicat ion of when, i f ever, p l a i n t i f f w i l l be ready to attend a 
hearing on defendant's Motion." 
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r e m a i n i n g c a u s e of P e n n e y ' s V e r i f i e d C o m p l a i n t . 
F e b r u a r y 16 , 1993 , Penney f i l e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE & FOR LEAVE TO COMPLETE 
DISCOVERY, t o g e t h e r w i t h s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t s of Dr . A l l e n J . 
M e r i l , M.D. , and Mr. W i l l i a m V. Penney . 
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t n e v e r g r a n t e d o r d e n i e d P e n n e y ' s Mot ion 
For C o n t i n u a n c e & For L e a v e . About F e b r u a r y 16 , 1 9 9 3 , t h e 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s s u e d a Minu te E n t r y g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s 7 Mot ion 
For Summary J u d g m e n t . About F e b r u a r y 18 , 1993 , t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t i s s u e d a Minu te E n t r y r e a f f i r m i n g i t s Minu te E n t r y of 
F e b r u a r y 16 , 1 9 9 3 . 2 
About March 9, 1993, the d i s t r i c t issued i t s ORDER grant ing 
defendants ' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Penney's 
ac t ion , including a l l claims asser ted the re in , with pre judice . 
About March 9, 1993, the d i s t r i c t court issued i t s JUDGEMENT 
grant ing judgment in favor of defendants and against Penney, 
dismissing p l a i n t i f f ' s ac t ion , including a l l claims asser ted 
the re in , with pre judice . 
In i t s 2/16/1993 Minute Entry granting defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment, the d i s t r i c t court concluded that i t had been "patient with Mr. 
Penney's e f f o r t s to get h i s case prepared so that he could go to t r i a l " and that 
"Pla int i f f has conducted e s s e n t i a l l y no discovery", even though Penney on 7/11/90 
had served upon defendants 87 separate de ta i l ed in terrogator ies and 31 separate 
de ta i l ed requests for production of documents which were only p a r t i a l l y answered 
by defendants; even though Penney, on 10/2/1990, noticed up the depos i t ions of 
defendants Williams and Buchanan which never took place because of scheduling 
object ions of defendants & t h e i r counsel , see R.70-71; even though Penney had 
promptly and d i l i g e n t l y responded to defendants' in terrogator ies and request for 
production of documents; even though Penney was subjected t o 2 1/2 f u l l days of 
grue l l ing depos i t ion questions notwithstanding agreement among counsel that 
Penney's depos i t ion be l imited to mornings only; and, even though Penney had been 
constant ly deluged with a never ending barrage of discovery proceedings including 
no l e s s than 16 Notices of Taking of Deposit ions (see appeals Index pp. 1-2; 
Docketing Statement attachments). 
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Penney timely filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL followed by a 
DOCKETING STATEMENT about May 10, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are supported by the record, and are the 
same facts that were relied on by Penney in defending himself 
against summary judgment at the District Court level.3 
1. In 1980, defendant E-Systems, Inc., ("E-Systems") sought 
out plaintiff William V. Penney ("Penney") for the purpose of 
hiring him as a procurement manager. 
2. Penney had received a total disability from Social 
Security in 1972 because of prior industrial and job-related 
accidents that left him with respiratory and spine problems. 
Defendant E-Systems was aware of Penney's health concerns. E-
Systems induced Penney to accept its offer of employment by 
representing the fact that E-Systems was self-insured and would, 
therefore, provide Penney with an essential health care policy 
that otherwise would have been difficult for him to obtain. 
3. Penney relied upon defendant's promise of insurance 
coverage, and he joined E-Systems as a procurement manager in 
December 1980. E-Systems required Penney to relocate from his 
home in Texas to the state of Utah, where he remained until he 
was unlawfully fired from E-Systems on June 18, 1986. 
4. Because of Penney's health problems, insurance was an 
essential benefit that Penney took care to preserve. At all 
times while employed at E-systems, Penney purchased the maximum 
3
 See Addendum, Ex "F" Docketing Statement, p. 3 §4. 
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insurance provided under the company policy. He also made 
certain that he had long term disability insurance. 
5. Penney had an excellent work record while he was 
employed at E-Systems. As procurement manager for the defendant, 
Penney earned numerous raises, commendations and promotions. 
Eventually, Penney rose to the position of Director of Purchasing 
in E-Systems' Montek division. 
6. Throughout his employment with E-Systems, Penney never 
received any warnings, notices, progressive discipline or other 
negative or adverse personnel actions, and E-Systems was unable 
to cite any instance where Penney exceeded the budget for his 
department. 
7. From about 1985, defendant David A. Williams 
("Williams") became the general manager of E-Systems' Montek 
Division. Williams attempted to intimidate and coerce Penney 
into resigning his position with E-Systems. Williams' 
intimidation took various forms: 1) mocking and deriding Penney's 
physical disabilities, 2) forcing Penney and his department to 
work thousands of hours of uncompensated overtime (in direct 
violation of public policy and E-Systems regulations), and 3) 
taunting Penney with job termination if he did not meet all 
Williams' arbitrary goals or if the department did not remain 
under budget. 
8. On or about May 9, 1986, Penney was injured in a 
hit-and-run accident, which caused him immediate, intense and 
continuous pain in three separate areas of his spine: cervical, 
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lumbar, and thoracic. Penney received an emergency room medical 
examination and treatment, a prescription for flexeril - a strong 
muscle relaxant, and a recommendation that he immediately see 
defendant E-Systems' inhouse doctor. 
9. Though Penney then had about 2 00 hours of accrued sick 
leave and about 40 hours of vacation, his requests for time to 
see defendant E-Systems' inhouse physician Dr. Hensleigh or to 
obtain other medical help were refused by defendant Williams who 
threatened that Penney would lose his job if he did not promptly 
complete all of his assigned tasks. 
10. Paranthetically it was not until after Penney was fired 
that he was finally examined by and received limited treatment 
from E-Systems' doctor, Dr. Hensleigh, who recommended that 
Penney go to his orthopedic specialist in Texas, Dr. Meril. 
11. Penney asked defendant Williams for permission to take 
sick leave/leave of absence and a temporary abatement of 
excessive overtime to help Penney recover from the injuries he 
had sustained in the hit-and-run accident. Williams refused. 
Instead, he threatened to fire Penney if he failed to quickly 
complete the projects on which he was currently working. 
12. Shortly before June 18, 1986, Penney completed the 
projects which he had been given. Penney then began to hear 
rumors that his department would soon be reorganized with a new 
director. He feared that Williams was finally taking steps to 
carry out his numerous threats. 
13. Penney spent several days preparing a job Justification 
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Package which he intended to present as a l a s t r e s o r t to persuade 
E-Systems Montek Div is ion ' s management t h a t he should not be 
f i r ed . 
14. As he had expected, on June 18, 1986, Penney was 
summoned to an "organizat ional meeting" chaired by defendant 
Williams. The purpose of the meeting was to carry out the f i r i n g 
of Penney.4 
15. Penney brought with him to the meeting the 
" J u s t i f i c a t i o n Package" t h a t he had prepared. Defendant Williams 
was furious t h a t Penney had an t ic ipa ted h i s ac t ions , and he 
immediately f i red Penney. Later t h a t day, Williams issued orders 
t h a t confirmed Penney's wrongful discharge of employment with E-
Systems. 
16. Following the "organizat ional meeting," Penney 
returned to h i s o f f ice . He followed the advice of defendant E-
Systems' cont rac t consultant and changed the t i t l e on the cover 
memo of h i s J u s t i f i c a t i o n Package to read " l e t t e r of res igna t ion" 
(leaving the e f fec t ive date blank) and modified the f ina l 
paragraph of the memo. In a l a s t d i tch e f for t to keep h i s job, 
Penney del ivered one se t of h i s J u s t i f i c a t i o n Package to 
defendant Williams' and one se t to Penney's immediate supervisor , 
Mr. Cocke. 
Defendants express ly admitted that "the termination of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
employment was discussed by management prior to h i s [a l l eged] res ignat ion" and 
that "Mr. Cocke recommended to Mr. Williams that p l a i n t i f f be terminated." 
Williams concurred and Cocke then consulted with Buchanan who a l so thought f i r ing 
would be appropriate. (See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 54 t o 
P l a i n t i f f ' s 1st Set of Interrogator ies . See a l so Aff idavi t of David A. Williams, 
paragraph 7 at R.478.) 
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17. The Justification Package submitted by Penney to Mr. 
Cocke and defendant Williams documented the "back-breaking 
overtime load" demanded by Williams and E-Systems, and that 
Penney objected to certain recent and proposed changes that would 
require additional excessive overtime to implement. 
18. By said Justification Package, Penney also indicated 
that he was being forced out of employment with E-Systems by the 
excessive, uncompensated overtime being unfairly and illegally 
imposed upon exempt salaried employees, including himself. 
19. Penney was summoned to Mr. Cocke's office to meet with 
him and defendant Mr. Alfred B. Buchanan ("Buchanan"), manager of 
Human Resources at E-Systems' Montek Division. Mr. Cocke 
confirmed Williams7 earlier firing of Penney by filling in the 
blank resignation space on the face of the modified memo attached 
to Penney's Justification Package. Mr. Cocke wrote in the date 
June 18, 1986. 
20. Penney immediately asked defendant Buchanan about 
severance benefits and specifically requested insurance 
conversion. Penney asked Buchanan to give him the necessary 
paperwork that would enable him to convert all of his E-Systems 
insurance to private non-E-Systems insurance. Defendant Buchanan 
promised to take care of the matter and report to Penney at his 
Exit Interview. Although Penney requested an Exit Interview, the 
interview was never granted. While Penney was packing up his 
personal belongings, he had a telephone conversation with 
Buchanan and again requested insurance conversion. 
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21. Although defendant Buchanan had promised to meet with 
Penney, perform an Exit Interview, and provide Penney with all 
necessary insurance conversion forms, he refused and failed to 
hold the Exit Interview. 
22. Buchanan also delayed sending Penney the necessary 
insurance conversion forms until it was too late for him to 
convert his E-System insurance policy to a policy underwritten by 
a private (non E-Systems) insurance company. Buchanan's grossly 
negligent act has resulted in Penney7s losing his insurance 
shortly after his wrongful termination and in Penney's remaining 
uninsured to this date. 
23. Meanwhile, Penney has been forced to assume an enormous 
financial burden because of his uninsured status. After 
undergoing conservative treatment and physical therapy, Penney's 
physical condition and corresponding mental condition have 
continued to deteriorate. Penny underwent five major surgeries 
as medical treatment for the injuries and pain caused by the hit 
and run accident of May 9, 1986, while still employed by 
defendant E-Systems.5 
24. On June 15, 1990, Penney initiated this current action 
in the Third Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake 
County, in the State of Utah. Penney sought relief under Utah 
contract and tort common law for his wrongful termination of 
employment. 
See Docketing Statement, p. 6, for a complete description of the 
surgeries. 
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•romptly after filing the lawsui- '"v • •. n 
u i *
 t .1 ist defei idants by serving on „.I;-;T; ^.qnty-seven (87) 
separate detailed formal written interrogatories and thirty-one 
I Mill separate detailed formal written requests for product; i or i>r 
iJl'i mi u n i o n ts. 
26. Many of these requests, defendants failed or refused 
answer completely, uther oi these requests, doff ml. in? • 1 a I J r <• 
or refused to answer M ' On numerous occasions, Penney ,s 
former attorney tried r, o schedule the depositions A 
defendants, but he was • :'e ^ enfed from ilniini n I 
conf] icts of defendants and/or thei r counsel. However, Penney 
was subjected to a grueling multi-day deposition i -/ Litate 
the ongoi ng <l:i scove * 
severe pain during this ordeal. 
.11. Because of t ::e norrendous medical and legal expenses 
occas s 
in Penney's Verified Complaint, Penney was forced to declare 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy and, consequent! y, has been forced to forego 
l i i T " i in | iiiiii .i I I i mi in 1 I 11 1 ! j p L e s o n i hi i . m s e l f Pro Se f ::: i: ivi :i :::1: l 
title remainder U I , L p r o c e e d i n g . 
2 8 . Although Penney informed t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t he was 
11 r o n " M n ' d i i* 1 1 1 \ i t 11 II ii I I I ' • 111,11 I I I 1 1 1 1 II in t
 (yi , . i i . , ' , i 11 L " m l n i ] < 11 II i » i 
mandatory back surgery ;. ^  August 2 9, ] 992, as part of his ongoing 
medical treatment, the trial court imposed :ron Penney an 
unrea unable ," " In ' ( ''i'l Pei n ie^ ^during 
day-to-day on strong prescription pain medication, was forced to 
risk his life 6 to make a painful and expensive trip from Texas 
to Salt Lake City, Utah to attend an August 3, 1992 pre-trial 
hearing with the district judge or face immediately dismissal of 
his lawsuit per the terms of the district court7s scheduling 
order. 
29• The trial court was advised that Penney's recovery from 
the August 19, 1992, back surgery would be slow and painful and 
would greatly impair Penney's ability to complete his discovery 
and pre-trial motions. The trial court was also aware that Penney 
was greatly disadvantaged in his prosecution of this lawsuit 
because he was forced to remove from Utah and reside in Texas 
during the course of his medical treatment. 
30. The scheduling order issued on August 3, 1992, (only 
two weeks prior to Penney's major surgery) set the case for trial 
on March 1, 1993, and required an end to discovery by 12/31/92 
and all dispositive motions to be heard by "Jan 4. 1992." (sic.)7 
Penney assumed that the time had passed for dispositive motions, 
not realizing that the year listed in the date provided by the 
court was in error. In addition to incorrect dates contained in 
this scheduling order, it was further confusing to Penney because 
it omitted certain apparent critical information like the date by 
which jury instructions were due, and the date by which exhibit 
6
 See Affidavit of Allen J. Meril, M.D. at R.565. 
Other examples of confusing signals sent by the district court to Penney 
were omission in the 8/3/92 scheduling order of due date for jury instructions, 
due date for exhibit and witness list exchange, failure of district court to give 
Penney notice of cancellation of court scheduled 2/22/93 pretrial settlement 
conference. See R.423-424. 
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and witness lists were /»-- exchanged. 
3 1 . Ue t e n d a n U . III1, IIIUWIMI t i sumiiht r y 11 ndyinent 
a g a i n s t Penney, and ." vas g r a n t e d . When Penney p e t i t i o n e d t h e 
court t'li a l l o w * *- - comple t ion of d i s c o v e r y and an e x t e n s i o n of 
11 II II i in 11
 t : • t:i 01 i s , 1:1: ic= ::: ::H i r t: • ::i i . e on 
Penney's motion, choosing rather to i ssue the order granting 
Summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Penney seeks a ruling from this court overturning the 
trial cour*-'^ order granting summary L idgment to the defendants. 
r ,.*>.L . .. . . . show: 
1. Mr. Penney will present case law and factual evidence 
demonstrating that the question of whether or not Mr. 
Penney resigned or was fired is a question of fact that 
should have been presented to a jury, and not a proper 
matter for summary judgment. 
2. Mr. Penney will present case law, statutory law and 
factual evidence demonstrating that whether or not 
defendants attempted to coerce Mr. Penney into 
participating in activities that violate public 
policy - and then fired him in part because of his 
refusal - is a matter of material fact properly decided 
by a jury and not for summary judgment, 
3. Mr. Penney will present factual evidence and poli cy 
arguments demonstrating that whether or not Mr. 
Penney's disabilities were a factor in his dismissal is 
properly a material fact that should be presented for 
jury determination, 
4^ Mr^ penney will present factual evidence demonstrate i :i j 
that whether or not defendants breached their own 
company policies and violated express and implied 
employment covenants is properly a question of material 
fact that should be presented for jury determination. 
5. Mr. Penney will present case law and factual evidence 
demonstrating that the breach of contract issue is not 
governed by ERISA and that Mr. Penney's loss of 
benefits is simply a matter of damages and shoul 
-14-
be the controlling issue in this case. Damages are 
properly decided by the jury and not a matter for 
summary judgment. 
6.. Mr. Penney will present case law and factual evidence 
demonstrating that whether or not Mr. Penney,s claim 
arises out of defendants, truly outrageous and 
intolerable "pattern of conduct" is a question of 
material fact that should be properly presented to a 
jury and is not a matter for summary judgment. 
7. Mr. Penney will present case law and factual evidence 
demonstrating that his request for an extension of time 
to complete discovery should have been granted by the 
trial court and would not have been prejudicial to 
defendants' case. 
8. Mr. Penney will present case law and factual evidence 
demonstrating that his Verified Complaint not only 
states valid legal claims upon which relief may be 
granted, but also avers many pertinent facts that 
bolster the claims of covenants both express and 
implied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in concluding as a matter of lav that 
Penney was not fired but rather resigned. 
Defendants repeatedly alleged that Mr. Penney was not fired 
but rather resigned. The trial court seems to accept said 
allegation in its Minute Entry of February 16, 1993, where the 
court said, "On the other hand several affidavits have been filed 
by the defendants which support ... their position that Penney 
resigned from employment rather than being terminated."8 
In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), the 
court held that the plaintiff was fired even though he "wrote a 
letter of resignation and delivered it to [one of the Bank's 
managers]"(emphasis added), even though the plaintiff "said that 
See Minute Entry at R.539-540. 
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he wnulcl continue employment with the Bank so long as he received 
Hi i i MI : defer iciai i t s '"sent 
[plaintiff letter wliich stated that [plaintiff] had 
resigned and the Board had accepted the resignation." Id.. , page 
1
 l I lii "' in.mi In mi I i 1c u l ib i t . .1 [jdit't1! c o e r c e i ' ' ' r e s i g n " s 
fired and voluntary termination. 
The evidence before the tri al court ii i the instant case was: 
a. Penney's sworn statement that he was unjustly involuntarily 
terminated or unjustly constructively terminated;9 
b. A copy of a memorandum ("Justification Package" to justify 
retention of Penney's job) submitted by Penney to defendants 
which was referenced as "SUBJECT: Letter of Resignation" 
but which contained NO resignation date, which complained of 
a "back-breaking overtime load" and of recent and proposed 
changes that would require additional excessive overtime to 
implement, and which ONLY offered resignation at some 
unspecified future time if suggested goals could not be 
by Penney;10 
c. Defendants' express
 a d m : [ s s i o n s t ha t "the termination of 
p l a i n t i f f ' s employment was discussed by management p r io r to 
h i s [al leged] resignation"1 1 , t h a t a t said time "Mr. Cocke 
recommended to [defendant] Mr. Williams t h a t p l a i n t i f f be 
te rminated ." , t ha t "Mr. Williams concurred with h i s 
recommendation [, and t ha t ] Mr. Cocke a lso consulted with 
[defendant] Mr. Buchanan, who likewise thought t h a t 
terminat ion would be . . . appropriate . . . " ; 1 2 and, 
d. Defendants' expressly admitted, in reference to said 
memorandum, t h a t "The l e t t e r a lso contained a blank 
Verif ied Complaint, f f 61 and 62 
Attachment "A" to defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated 12/31/1992 
11
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 54 to P l a i n t i f f ' s 1st 
Set ol Interrogator ies 
12
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 54 to P l a i n t i f f ' s 1st 
:>et„ of I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s ; Af f idav i t of [defendant] David A. W:i ] ] iams R. 48 1 7. 
- 1 6 -
resignation date" which was filled in by defendants.13 
Summary judgement in a wrongful termination case might be 
appropriate where there is uncontroverted evidence that the 
plaintiff resigned rather than being fired. However, in Penney's 
case, like Heslop, supra, there is a genuine issue of material 
fact making summary judgment wholly inappropriate. 
II. Trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
Penney was not fired in violation of public policy* 
In Peterson v. Browning Co., 832 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah 1992) 
the court holds that the public policy exception to Utah's 
employment-at-will doctrine gives rise to an action in tort. 
Peterson also defines the public policy exception as generally 
involving termination of employment for (1) refusing to commit an 
illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing a public obligation, or 
(3) exercising a legal right or privilege. Id. at 1281. 
In firing Penney, E-Systems willfully violated public policy 
in the following ways: (1) E-Systems fired Penney because of his 
refusal to commit or condone wrongful acts; (2) E-Systems fired 
Penney because of his attempt to exercise a legal right to take 
sick leave after his accident and because he sought temporary 
abatement of excessive overtime; and (3) E-Systems fired Penney 
because defendant Williams concluded that Penney might disclose 
certain clandestine and illegal electronic spying activities in 
See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 58 to Plaintiff's 1st 
Set of Interrogatories 
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which defendant E-Systems was invol v;.; 
(1) E-Systems fired Penney because .. his refusal tu commit 
or condone a wrongful act. 
i imi in ii > ' p h • mi in I  i » " ' i • - » - 1 1 1 f 1 o i n 1 ..I n I W i I  I 11 I 11111 i f J « | u I . .... t. e n , 1 t" | i - i t 
Penney participate in iraudulent and illegal falsificatior -f 
reports and material pricing records sent ~; E-Systems' clients. 
Thi" i i " 11 Ih nil t Ii r up , i.U»iu;ii . 1 
others. • *. instance, Penney refused either condone :r 
participate ^ ^ requested wrongful *^ 
Be . .: . ii:! I U L » . . I I . • n".11 11 n.'o 1 and 
unlawful practices, Penney fel ..• r^rvor with E-Systems' 
management personnel was harassed, criticized, and told that 
j 
Defendant W:iiia^s resented Penney's refusal and punished 
Penney by demanding ir reasingly more uncompensated overtime and 
.;; . .- i .na an 
-r v ironmenr ot duress ; . *. .• ,..•:->. place. At a I I times, defendant 
- , - vr .-^ 4 aware ui Penney' - ; .'..diious neaitn 
^i ,i? \ iams repeated: hreatened ^° f .. . 
14
 See Penney's Jan. 23, 1993 "Affidavit", Addendum Exhibit "C" which 
testifies of E-System illegal involvment of KAL007 jet crash & shows newspaper 
articles re same. 
15
 Verified Complaint, pp.10-13, Docketing Statemen 
Notwithstanding defendants' argument (R. ?? and R. ??) that no dispute 
did
 o r could exist between E-Systems and Hazeltine Corporation, for 
incontrovertible evidence of a genuine issue of material fact, see Addendum 
Exhibit "E" E-Systems Inc./Montek Division v. Hazeltine Corporation, filed 
7/20/89 as Civil No. C-89-890904469, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, where E-Systems (by Ray, Quinney & Nebeker) sues 
Hazeltine for "no less than $20,000,000". 
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Penney, if Penney should fail in any measure to satisfy William's 
increasing demands. 
Public policy has long been opposed to perpetuating 
fraudulent business practices, as evidenced by the numerous state 
and federal laws governing business fraud, by the development of 
law enforcement agency departments designed to investigate 
unlawful business practices, and by the creation of business 
organizations and bureaus designed to deter unethical and 
fraudulent business transactions. 
The public at large has a vested interest in protecting 
those who would keep to a high standard of ethics in their 
business dealings, and the public also has a vested interest in 
punishing those companies that deal in misrepresentations, 
fraudulent pricing practices, and other illegal or unethical 
business methods. If the courts, lawmakers, and the general 
public were to tolerate business fraud in any form, it would be 
tantamount to supporting the deterioration of our society's 
economic structure. Wherever it is possible to do so, public 
policy must demand fair dealings and honest business practices. 
In confirming the conclusions reached earlier in Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), the Supreme 
Court of Utah stated that the public policy exception provides an 
incentive for employers to refrain from using their unique 
economic positions to coerce employee conduct that contravenes 
clear and substantial public policies. Peterson v. Browning Co. 
832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). 
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Heslop v. Bank of Utah 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 19 92) the 
111.1 in in - i, i i t:l: i !::,]: le management at the 
Bank (where he was employed) when he refused to go along 
with falsifying bank record* *~ hide an accrual error, Heslop 
.1 ; I i .Linsf CM:i" • J <im • ; .reed 
resignation came mucn l ^ r ar.a aftv: i: apparently unrelated 
incident , it wis c -> * >r -• Heslop "marked m a n " from the 
ini.i I I n i i f i . - were 
unethical and illegal business practices. 
reversing the t * i^'s decision granting the Bank 
s public nolicy claims, t;^ 
Utah Court of Appeals stated, "We do net u : ee ** . : . • ~e x.ri^i 
court that reasonable minds could not differ c 
*ctor in Heslop'^ termination * • ~ 
the question of causation :i i i th i s case . s. close, . t.- believe that 
plaintiff presented enough evidence ot resentmer 
tebtjll u-l In J defense ot public policy that the question of 
whether that policy was a substantial factor in his termination 
s h o u i a r v b e e n p i pe,* nt MI I I n I I | in ,' il i mi 11 ml n i MI i iihii I i n " 
I d . at: f 
Penney, like Heslop In the above case, followed -.i 
conscience : matters of business * i i 
as b :: i 1: is company should legai - . ike Heslop, Penney 
fell out of favor wibh managemenb and was no longer seen as a 
"beam 'Hi1 MI I I i s a u r e e i I i i I 
pracbices. Similar to the Bank of Utah's breabment of Heslop, E-
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Systems' management created an atmosphere of duress and sought to 
punish Penney by removing responsibility from him while 
increasing his work load. 
Eventually, Penney, like Heslop, was placed in a position 
where he was either wrongfully fired or, in the alternative, was 
forced to resign for good cause. In either event, the 
termination was done because of Penney7s refusal to violate 
public policy. The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on this issue. In this case, issues of material fact 
exist that can only be decided by a jury. 
Public interest in promoting honesty in business 
transactions demands that Penney have the opportunity of 
presenting his facts before a jury. Penney, therefore, requests 
that the Utah Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's Summary 
Judgment decision on this issue. 
(2) In violation of public policy, E-Systems fired Penney 
for attempting to exercise his legal right to take sick 
leave after his accident and for seeking temporary abatement 
of excessive overtime. 
The Fair Labor Standard's Act ("the Act"), U.S.C.A. 29:201-
219, when read in its entirety, among other things stands for the 
proposition that when employees are hired for full-time 
employment, it is assumed that the standard work week will be 40 
hours long, and that any additional work hours required by the 
employer will be duly compensated. The Act is adamant in a 
defending a worker's right not to be forced to work excessive 
overtime, even to the point of saying that a laborer cannot agree 
to waive this right. The Act is ample evidence of the general 
-21-
p u b l i c p o i i ^ v a g a i n s t - : •• "sweat-shop" m e n t a l i t y of the i ' lfh 
• •' ,,
 n j, •. • * i I e 11 11 u ' 11 "W" M I I I «111 ! r i • 1 '"" u l d r e i \ ' & 
sole benefit . .^u employer. 
Through the creation v labor unions and the passing ;±. 
:: • = s , s i i :i,l 1 \nt 
aforementioned, the public has demonstrated its desire to set 
policy governing wna*: employers may lawful. iemand from 
.• :- , . .cy would be " ^nrn 
our backs on the progress society has made toward a humane work 
environment, and would i-> contrar*. *-: ;. ubiic interest. 
systems , . ...... . .. w-*'^  'or 
sick leave and discouraged excessiv- overtime, "when Penney was 
injured - lit-and-run accident "* .* :"£ 
i i mi I in if i 111 iu.K.1 LiUJiiu MI ins ,i'4U hours ol accrued sick 
leave for the purpose or recuperating from the accident.18 
When Williams refused to allow Penm y 
ctskeil "1.11 I I J ani,.. . . .t-.^ wt a temporary abatement of excessive 
overtime until his injuries healed.19 
Williams - - - refused Penney' s i: easonab] <= i: eqi lests 1: n :i !:: 
alsu Ihreatenea : . Penney i f 1 le did no t conti i me working at 
his former rate c: production. 
17
 Veri f ied Comp 1 a:i nil f 1 8 1 9 I 5 5 
15
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants admit Mr. Penney had accrued 40.04 
hours of vacation and 240 hours of sick leave at termination. See Defendants' 
Response No. 63 to Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories. 
i>
 Mr»e Penney's department had been forced to work thousands of hours of 
uncompensated overtime, a fact that Mr. Penney well documented in his 
"Justification Package." See Addendum Exhibit "F" Docketing Statement, pp. 7-9. 
Although Penney continued to work while suffering from his 
injuries, and although he completed all the tasks required by 
Williams, just one month later Penney was constructively fired. 
Penney believes that his attempt to exercise his legal right to 
use sick leave and his lawful request for an abatement of 
excessive overtime was a significant factor in Williams' decision 
to let him go. 
A company that provides for sick leave and then fires its 
employees when they need to use that sick leave is violating 
public policy. To condone such inhumane treatment of employees 
is clearly and substantially opposed to the public policy and 
public interest. A company that demands and can require any 
arbitrary amount of overtime is attempting to return to the 
"sweat-shop11 policies of a previous century. Public policy and 
public interest demand that employers impose reasonable 
requirements upon their workers. Public policy limits required 
overtime not only for humane reasons, but also for the necessity 
of creating jobs for the general public. The more overtime 
employers are allowed to require of their employees, the less 
need the employers will have to hire additional workers. 
Other courts have recognized the necessity of limiting the 
amount of overtime that may be required by an employer. Some 
courts have ruled that the payment of a fixed salary - regardless 
of number of hours worked in a week - does not satisfy the 
overtime requirements of the Act, notwithstanding that such 
salary equals or exceeds the statutory minimum for regular time 
-23-
plus time J:-,, \^if ^ vertime, for hours actually worked, and 
in I MI Mint: i' I IMIJ I I M L t h e t i x e d s a l a r y 
shall cover both regular and overtime work. See Walling v. Stone, 
131 I ,2cl 4 61 (1 94 2 ) . See also, Colbeck v. Dairy land Creamery 
Co , mi :; i i it i  2- I 21 
On the issue ^ uncompensated overtime, Johnson v. Dierks 
Lumber & Coal Co. , 130 F.2d *!* r L^Jc * h - *-ie ui does not 
- ". ime and 
compensate him :*:: *;' \\ . • •: : t , r*xw ai. agreement to pay for 
« '- - p:-- --'- * r*e actual hours which an en -• in i incil 
This iss-- ~ whether r :i\: abusive overtime requirements 
and refusal * - > : ' ^ \ .so cf rightful accrued si ck ] ea ve 
L-. .,:. ,ssue for the jury to 
decide and should be decided fay summary judgment. 
III. Trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
Penney was not fired in violation of laws against disabled. 
Although E-Systems recruited and hired Penney with fi111 
knowledge of his disabil it M<S d^f PHK! JUII HI I I i niii1 mil i i HI 
c: •. ;isisten.lv showed i io toleration for Penney or any other E-
Systems employee with health problems.20 
Williams often made fun I tiiosp pinp 11 tyees i ill Ii« ibi I i t i e s 
or po :: i healtl I Oi i one occasion, Wi lliams insisted subordinates 
take work over to a si ck employee who was recuperating at home 
with a back injury. 
20 
S e e R . 5 o f t h e Ve:i :i :l:::i e • :!! Coi up I a :i i it. 
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To Penney, it seemed apparent that Williams could not 
tolerate any employees with health or physical disabilities. 
Penney has reason to believe that Williams' constant threats to 
fire him, and his repeated derisive remarks concerning his 
disabilities were designed to create an atmosphere of duress that 
would make the work place intolerable for anyone with Penney's 
physical limitations. 
Such treatment was especially unfair, considering the fact 
that E-Systems hired Penney with full knowledge that Penney was 
disabled. And this treatment was also unfair, considering the 
fact that Penney's job performance was of the highest 
productivity and level of excellence in spite of his physical 
challenges. 
The following facts are in evidence before the court in the 
instant case: 
a. Penney offered uncontroverted sworn testimony that prior to 
his employment with E-Systems, Penney had received a total 
disability from Social Security in 1972 because of prior 
industrial and job related accidents that had left Penney 
with respiratory and back problems.21 
b. Penney offered uncontroverted sworn testimony that, on or 
about May 9, 1986, Penney was injured in a hit-and-run 
accident, which caused Penney immediate, intense and 
continuous pain.22 
c. As a result of said hit-and-run accident, Penney underwent 
major surgery on his neck in 1988 and 1989, on his lower 
back on November 13, 1991, on his T7 vertebral body on March 
10, 1992, and on his L3-4 and L4-5 vertebral body on August 
21
 Verified Complaint, R.4, 5 9; Answer, R.35, 5 9. 
22
 Verified Complaint, R.7, 5 27-28; Answer, R.37, 5 27-28. 
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19, 1992. 
d. Penney testified that when Defendant Williams became the 
General Manager of the Montek Division of E-Systems which 
employed Penney, Defendant Williams showed a lack of 
toleration for health problems and made fun of Penney 
because of his disabilities, which Defendant Williams 
denied.24 So great was defendant Williams' animosity toward 
Penney, that Penney felt compelled to and did begin from 
this time forward to seek a transfer to another division of 
E-Systems or to obtain employment elsewhere. 
e. Penney testified that, despite his physical disabilities and 
recent injury, he was required by Defendant Williams to work 
a vast number of overtime hours, 25 and defendants conceded 
that Penney "may sometimes have worked long hours."26 
f. Penney testified that Defendant Williams refused to give 
Penney sick leave or leave of absence to recuperate from the 
hit and run accident and, instead, gave Penney a ultimatum 
timely to complete all current projects or to lose his job, 
forcing Penney to work for the following five or six weeks 
in extreme back-breaking pain.27 
g. On June 18, 1986, Defendant Williams instructed Penney's 
supervisor Mr. J. G. Cocke to involuntarily terminate 
Penney. 
h. Defendant E-Systems was, at all relevant times, a Federal 
contractor under contract with the Federal government, both 
as a prime contractor and as a subcontractor, working under 
more than one Federal contract, each of which was for more 
than $2,500 in goods and/or services. 
i. Penney, at all relevant times, as an employee of defendant 
E-Systems, was an employee of a Federal contractor working 
on contracts or subcontracts each of which was for more than 
$2,500 in goods and/or services. 
j. There was in effect at all relevant times a Federal law 
Li
 Affidavits of Dr. Allen J. Meril, M.D. R.603-605, and William V. Penney 
R.573-585. 
24
 Verified Complaint R.5, H 15 & 16; Answer, R.47-48. 
25
 Verified Complaint R.6, 5 21. 
26
 Answer, R.35, H 14. 
27
 Verified Complaint, R.7, HH 29, 30, & 31. 
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requiring that all Federal contractors engaged in Federal 
contracts take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment qualified handicapped individuals having a 
physical impairment which substantially limits one or more 
of such persons major life activities, has a record of such 
impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment;28 
k. One or more of the defendants discriminated against Penney 
in his employment and advancement while he was employed with 
defendant E-Systems and said discrimination was on the basis 
of Penney's physical handicap and disabilities. 
1. One or more of the defendants discriminated against Penney 
by involuntarily terminating Penney7s employment with 
defendant E-Systems on the basis of Penney's physical 
handicap and disabilities. 
Federal laws implicitly preempt otherwise applicable state 
law because of the Federal laws' comprehensiveness and 
pervasiveness of enforcement scheme and implementing regulations, 
dominance of federal interest in field of federal contracts, and 
need for uniform, consistent federal approach to discrimination 
against handicapped persons by Federal contractors, which would 
be frustrated by varying state law interpretations.29 
IV. Trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
Penney was not fired in violation of a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
In Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment, defendants provided a lengthy but 
misguided analysis of the issue at hand. Defendants' request for 
summary judgment was based on their mistaken assumption that E-
System's covenant of good faith and fair dealing was an "implied" 
29 United States Code Annotated §793 
Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552 (C.A. Ala. 1983) 
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covenant. 
Defendants cite Utah case law which they allege does not 
recognize any claim for breach of an "implied" covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in the employment context. 
Penney, however, has alleged from the outset that E-Systems 
policies and their personal communications to Penney, both oral 
and written, expressly promised that E-Systems would not 
arbitrarily and without good cause, refuse to retain Penney 
The defendants also admitted the existence of express 
employment covenants. 
Defendants expressly admitted30 that E-Systems entered into 
an "oral contract" with Penney. 
Defendants expressly admitted31 that E-Systems had a 
corporate policy concerning "terminations" contained in E-
Systems/Montek Directive No. 2 00.4, and that consistent with that 
policy, the procedure established and used at E-Systems' Montek 
Division for processing voluntary and involuntary terminations 
was to have the terminating employee sign a document entitled 
"Termination Checklist", affirming that he or she had discussed 
certain topics with a member of the employee relations department 
and has received a final paycheck for all wages. 
Defendants expressly admitted that E-Systems has a written 
policy regarding performance appraisals and merit increases as 
30 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories, 
Response No. 30 Addendum Exhibit "A". 
1
 Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories, 
Response No. 44 Addendum Exhibit "A". 
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set forth in E-Systems/Montek Division Directive No. 200.632 and 
that Penney received periodic performance appraisals as a 
condition of continued employment with E-Systems.33 
Defendants expressly admitted that E-Systems had a written 
policy governing "severance pay" as set forth in E-Systems/Montek 
Division Directive No. 200.3 where severance pay was available 
for laid off employees but not for those involuntarily 
terminated.34 
Defendants expressly admitted that E-Systems had written 
policies regarding and governing "treatment of the disabled" (E-
Systems/Montek Division Directive No. 200.42),35, "business 
conduct and ethics" (E-Systems/Montek Division Directive No. 
200.46)36, 
Defendants expressly admitted that Penney had never been 
warned or disciplined prior to termination.37 
Defendants expressly admitted that E-Systems management 
2
 See Addendum "Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's 1st Set 
of Interrogatories, Response Nos. 46 & 31. 
33
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's 1st Set 
of Interrogatories, Response No. 32 Addendum. 
34
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 47 to Plaintiff's 1st 
Interrogatories. 
35
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 49 to Plaintiff's 1st 
Set of Interrogatories. 
36
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 52 to Plaintiff's 1st 
Set of Interrogatories. 
37
 See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants Response No. 54 to Plaintiff's 1st 
Set of Interrogatories. 
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fired Penney on June 18, 1986.38 
Defendants admit that, before they fired Penney, defendant 
E-Systems had issued numerous formal written policies in the form 
of E-Systems/Montek Directives which established a contract for 
employment between E-Systems and Penney which was more than a 
contract at will. 
The contract of employment between defendant E-Systems and 
Penney provided for progressive discipline prior to any 
involuntary termination and required the defendants not 
arbitrarily to terminate Penney nor arbitrarily to force him to 
resign BUT rather required defendants to give Penney adequate 
notice and warning regarding any actions by Penney that could 
result in his termination, together with an opportunity to cure 
any deficiency in Penney7s actions or behavior that might result 
in his termination; 
Until the very day defendants involuntarily terminated him, 
Penney had an excellent record with E-Systems including, and 
without limitation, numerous raises, promotions, and 
commendations and ABSOLUTELY devoid of any warnings, notices, 
progressive discipline or other negative or adverse personnel 
actions. Defendants, in violation of the terms and conditions of 
defendant E-Systems' own express written policies and employment 
contract with Penney, arbitrarily, capriciously and without any 
justification involuntarily terminated Penney without any prior 
See Addendum Exhibit "A" Defendants' Response No. 58 to Plaintiff's 1st 
Set of Interrogatories. 
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notice, warning, progressive discipline or opportunity to cure 
any alleged deficiency in Penney7s actions or behavior that might 
result in his termination. 
In summary, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether or not E-Systems7 established an "express" covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing with Penney. 
The trial court was misled by defendants7 motion for summary 
judgment into believing that Penney had alleged only an "implied" 
covenant. 
The issue of whether the contract covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is "implied" or "express" is one that should 
properly be certified to a jury for determination and not a 
matter for summary judgment. 
V* Trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
defendants did not breach E-Systems7 contract with Penney, 
resulting in Penney7s loss of benefits. 
In Defendants7 Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, defendants7 claim that Penney7s breach 
of contract cause of action is preempted by ERISA. Defendants 
base this assertion on the fact that ERISA governs employee 
benefit plans. 
However, Penney contends that ERISA does not apply in the 
instant case. Case law cited by defendants in support of their 
argument illustrates that ERISA applies cnly where a benefit plan 
itself, or specific benefits provided under such a plan, are at 
issue. 
In the instant case, Penney has raised no issue regarding 
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any benefit plan, nor has he raised any issue regarding specific 
benefits under any plan. 
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987), 
the United States Supreme Court explains the governing policy 
behind ERISA. The Court refers to the plan as "balancing the 
need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the 
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit 
plans." 
The Court continues on to say that the plan would be 
undermined if ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries were 
allowed to seek alternative remedies under state law. Id. at 54. 
Clearly, Penney is neither an ERISA participant nor an ERISA 
beneficiary. Neither does Penney seek any "claim settlement" as 
referred to by the Court in Pilot Life Ins. Co.. 
Penney's cause of action arises solely from defendant's 
failure to follow and fulfill contract obligations. 
The end result of these willful or negligent contract 
violations was to deprive Penney of the participant or 
beneficiary status under ERISA referred to by the Court. 
Defendants are confusing damages with issues. Penney 
presents no claim against any benefit plan. Nor does he seek the 
court's ruling on any aspect of the benefit plan. 
Penney merely claims the loss of benefits as substantial 
damages sustained because of defendants' violation of their own 
company policy and express oral covenants. 
Indeed, defendants violated their own policies by the manner 
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in which Penney was fired. 
The relevant facts in evidence before this court are: 
a. The contract of employment between defendant E-Systems and 
Penney provided for progressive discipline prior to any 
involuntary termination and required the defendants not 
arbitrarily to terminate Penney nor arbitrarily to force him 
to resign. The contract of employment required defendants 
to give Penney adequate notice and warning regarding any 
actions by Penney that could result in his termination, 
together with an opportunity to cure any deficiency in 
Penney's actions or behavior that might result in his 
termination. 
b. Defendants, in violation of the terms and conditions of E-
Systems' own express written policies and employment 
contract with Penney, arbitrarily, capriciously and without 
any justification involuntarily terminated Mr. Penney 
without any prior notice, warning, progressive discipline or 
opportunity to cure any alleged deficiency in Penney's 
actions or behavior that might result in his termination. 
c. Defendants expressly admitted that E-Systems had a corporate 
policy concerning "terminations" contained in E-
Systems/Montek Directive No. 200.4, and that consistent with 
that policy, the procedure established and used at E-
Systems' Montek Division for processing both voluntary and 
involuntary terminations was to have an Exit Interview with 
the terminating employee and to have that terminating 
employee sign a document entitled "Termination Checklist," 
affirming that he or she had discussed certain topics with a 
member of the employee relations department and had received 
a final paycheck for all wages. (See Defendants' Response 
to Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories, Response No. 44.) 
4. On or about 6/18/86, defendant Buchanan made an oral promise 
to provide Penney with the proper forms for insurance 
conversion at Penney's Exit Interview. In violation of this 
oral covenant and E-Systems' express policies, no Exit 
Interview was granted Penney (despite his repeated requests 
for such an interview), no Termination Checklist was ever 
presented to Penney, and no insurance conversion papers were 
provided to Penney until it was too late for him to use 
them. (See Deposition of William v. Penney, at pp. 277-279. 
See also, Verified Complaint p. 2, paragraph 5, and p. 8, 
paragraphs 41-47. 
In summary, defendants willfully or negligently violated 
their own express oral and written covenants and policies 
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regarding their employment contract with Penney. These 
violations occurred in the form of (1) firing Penney without 
warning or good cause; (2) failing to follow termination 
procedures governing both voluntary and involuntary terminations, 
regarding Exit Interviews, Termination Checklists, and benefit 
conversion documentation; and (3) failing to honor oral 
commitments and covenants to hold an Exit Interview and furnish 
benefit conversion documents. 
The aforementioned violations resulted in monetary damages 
to Penney that defendants expressly admit include Health Care and 
Weekly Income Disability Plan (Salaried Flexcomp Plan A), Long 
Term Disability Plan, Long Term Disability Plan Plus, and Term 
Life Insurance.39 
Whether or not defendants violated their own contract 
covenants and obligations is a matter of material fact that is 
appropriate only for jury determination. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in granting defendants summary judgment on this 
issue. 
VI. Trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that 
defendants7 alleged actions did not state a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, pain and 
suffering. 
Defendants7 Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment cites Sperber v. Galligher Ash Co., 747 
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987) as support for the proposition that the 
39 
For a more complete list of damages, see Defendants' Response No.61 to 
Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories Addendum Exhibit "A", 
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district court should dismiss Penney7s emotional distress case.40 
In Sperber, the plaintiff sued his former employer for, 
among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The appellate court upheld the summary judgment dismissal of the 
emotional distress claim, but the court expressly recognized that 
an emotional distress claim could be successfully maintained 
against a former employer if "outrageous and intolerable" conduct 
is alleged and proven. The Sperber court cited the applicable 
rules governing intentional infliction of emotional distress: 
Mere discharge from employment does not constitute 
outrageous or intolerable conduct by an employer. Id. at 
347. 
To state a claim, ... a plaintiff must additionally allege 
conduct on the part of the defendant that is outrageous and 
intolerable to the extent that it offends societal standards 
of morality and decency. Id. at 347. 
In Larson v. SYSCO Corp.. 767 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah 1989) the 
court found that if sufficient "outrageous conduct" has attended 
termination, the plaintiff may maintain an action of emotional 
distress. Larson had the legal right but lost because the facts 
alleged against the employer did not meet the "outrageous 
conduct" test. 
While the same rules should apply in Penney's case, Penney's 
factual allegations and evidence are distinguishable from the 
facts in Sperber and in Larson. 
Penney's emotional distress claim is not based merely on 
See R.205-210. 
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being fired. Rather, Penney's claim arises out of a truly 
"outrageous and intolerable" pattern of conduct by defendant 
Williams, individually and as General Manager of Montek Division 
of defendant E-Systems, as assisted by defendant Buchanan. It 
was a pattern of conduct that was outrageous and intolerable to 
the extent that it offends societal standards of morality and 
decency. So much so, that in recent years new federal and state 
laws have been passed to prevent employers and management from 
engaging in the very acts defendants perpetrated against Penney. 
In Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344, 11 Utah 2d 289 (Utah 
1961), the plaintiff filed a claim for "infliction of severe 
emotional distress by wilful and wanton conduct of an outrageous 
and intolerable nature," alleging that the defendant repeatedly 
and persistently called plaintiff by phone soliciting plaintiff 
to have illicit sexual relations. Defendant came to plaintiff's 
house and continued to make said solicitations and indecently 
exposed his person. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by the 
district court upon a summary judgment motion. In reversing the 
summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the Samms court 
set down the following pertinent rules: 
Where the act is willful or malicious, as distinguished from 
being merely negligent, that recovery may be had for mental 
pain, though no physical injury results. Id. at 346. 
While mental suffering, unaccompanied by injury to purse or 
person, affords no basis for an action predicated upon 
wrongful acts, merely negligent, yet such damages may be 
recovered in those cases where the plaintiff had suffered at 
the hands of the defendant a wanton, voluntary, or 
intentional wrong the natural result of which is the 
causation of mental suffering and wounded feelings. Id. at 
346. 
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Though the Samms court concluded that merely asking another 
to have sexual intercourse is not sufficient grounds to support 
an emotional distress claim, in reversing the summary judgment 
the court observed that the plaintiff's allegations involved more 
than a mere request and constituted aggravated circumstances. 
Dismissal of Penney's emotional distress claim might be 
appropriate if the claim were based solely on defendants' firing 
of Penney. However, whether or not defendants' pattern of 
conduct - that preceded and attended Penney's firing - rises to 
the level of "outrageous and intolerable" is a question of 
material fact properly decided by a jury and not by summary 
judgment.41 
B. Penney's emotional distress claim is NOT barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act. 
Defendants Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment contains at R. 202 a lengthy argument mistakenly 
relying upon Utah Code Annotated (1988) §35-1-60 and Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 773 P.2d 405 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, 795 P.2d 1138, Star v. Indus. Comm'n, 615 P.2d 436, 637 
(Utah 1980), as support for the erroneous proposition that the 
Utah Worker's Compensation Act bars a claim by an employee 
against a former employer for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
For further relevant facts concerning Penney's emotional distress 
claim, see Docketing Statement, p.42,§ VI Addendum Exhibit "A". 
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In Mounteer, supra, the plaintiff sued his former employer 
for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The final resolution of the Mounteer case was reported 
in Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co. ("Mounteer II11) , 823 P.2d 
1055 (Utah 1991), where the appellate court made it absolutely 
clear that the Utah Worker's Compensation Act does NOT bar a 
claim by an employee against an employer for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
The appellate court in Bryan v. Utah International, 533 P.2d 
892 (Utah 1975), was just as clear on the subject declaring that: 
Nowhere does the [Utah Worker's Compensation] act deal 
directly with intentional acts, such as the [intentional 
infliction of emotional distress] alleged here . . . We 
think that such a[n] [exclusivity] provision is not a 
prohibition against the maintenance of an action for 
damages, because of an intentional act. The policy of our 
law has always been to allow one injured through the 
intentional act of another, to seek redress from the one 
intending harm. That policy has the salutary effect of 
deterring intentional injury. Id. at 894. 
C. Penney's emotional distress claim is NOT barred by the 
Statute of Limitations. 
On June 18, 1986, Mr. Penney left the State of Utah and 
moved to Texas where he has lived continuously ever since. Other 
than a few short visits to Utah in connection with the initiation 
of this lawsuit, Penney has not been in the State of Utah since 
his relocation to Texas in January 1987. 
(1) Penney's absence from Utah tolls the statute of 
limitations. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §78-12-35 provides, in 
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pertinent part: 
•.. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action. 
Hence, the four (4) year statute of limitations on Penney's 
emotional distress claim was tolled for all but approximately 
seven (7) months between June 18, 1986 and the filing of the 
lawsuit on June 15, 1990. 
In Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snvder. 51 Utah 227, 169 P.954 
(1917), the court held that the statute of limitations runs only 
during the time the debtor is openly in state, and immediately on 
his leaving it the statute again ceases to run until his return. 
In computing time, all periods of absence must be considered and 
added together. Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) holds that Utah allows the statute of limitations to 
be tolled during absences, even where the defendant resides in 
the state and service can be made upon persons at his residence, 
and that proceedings under Nonresident Motorist Act are the only 
Utah proceedings in which the applicable statute of limitations 
is not tolled by absence from the state. 
This is particularly fair in Penney's case since the 
defendants were responsible for driving Penney from Utah by 
firing him and wrongfully depriving him of insurance, leaving 
Penney no alternative but to relocate to Texas where he could 
receive essential medical treatment for his 1986 automobile 
accident. 
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(2) Penney's emotional distress claim accrued within 
the applicable four (4) year statute of 
limitations. 
Even if the four (4) year statute of limitations against 
Penney's emotional distress claim had not been tolled by Penney's 
absence from the State of Utah of almost four (4) years prior to 
filing this lawsuit, Defendants assertion that Penney7s emotional 
distress claim accrued outside of the four (4) year statute of 
limitations is still in error. 
Defendants seem to take the position that Penney's emotional 
distress claim, if actionable at all, is actually six (6) 
separate claims, one for each of the six (6) actions defendants 
say Penney is alleging. Defendants argue that Penney's emotional 
distress claim is time-barred to the extent any of said six 
separate claims occurred before June 15, 1986. 
Defendants' mischaracterization of the facts omits any 
reference to defendant Williams' unjustified constant threats of 
immediate termination, and defendant Williams' unjustifiably 
circumventing the standard chain of command to order and impose 
upon Penney and those who worked for him excessive amounts of 
overtime work. 
Penney's emotional distress claim did not accrue from a 
single instance of excessive overtime, or of unjustified threats 
by defendant Williams to immediately terminate Penney, or of the 
wrongful termination, or from defendants' wrongfully depriving 
Penney of his insurance rights. 
Rather, Penney's emotional distress claim accrued from a 
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pattern of conduct that was outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offends societal standards of morality and decency. Penney's 
evidence shows the defendants' conduct ripened into an actionable 
claim within 4 years of when Penney filed his lawsuits. 
Hence, Penney contends that his emotional distress claim 
accrued within the four (4) year statute of limitations, even 
without considering his absence from the State of Utah. 
(3) Penney Suffered Emotional Distress. 
Defendants assert that Penney's emotional distress claim 
should have been dismissed because during the entire time he was 
employed at E-Systems, he never received any medication or 
treatment from a medical professional for emotional distress. 
However, defendants offer no evidence that Penney did not 
suffer emotional distress, and defendants admit that Penney 
sought medical treatment for his severe emotional distress in May 
of 1989. 42 
Whether the severe emotional distress for which Penney 
sought treatment in May of 1989 was a continued manifestation of 
the emotional distress caused by defendants or was caused by the 
acts or omissions of one or more of the defendants clearly is a 
genuine material issue of fact to be determined by a trier of 
fact and not by counsel for the defendants. 
VII. Trial court abused its discretion and otherwise erred in 
failing to grant Penney's Motion for extension of time to 
complete discovery and trial preparation. 
See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at R.210. 
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On February 16, 1993, Penney filed with the district court a 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE & FOR LEAVE TO COMPLETE 
DISCOVERY. The Motion requested that the 2/22/93 Pretrial 
Settlement Conference and the 3/1/93 Trial be continued for five 
(5) months and that Penney be allowed during that time to resume 
and complete discovery. Penney's Motion was supported by his own 
affidavit and by an AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN J. MERIL, M.D. 
Dr. Allen J. Meril's affidavit documented that Penney had 
undergone five (5) major surgeries on the following dates as a 
result of his 1986 automobile accident: 7/27/1988, 5/4/1989, 
11/13/1991, 3/10/1992, and 8/19/1992.43 
Penney's motion for continuance and leave to complete 
discovery, together with the supporting affidavits of Dr. Allen 
J. Meril, M.D. and Penney, clearly established that Penney's 
mandatory surgeries on November 13, 1991, March 10, 1992, and 
August 19, 1992 and consequent convalescence had left Penney 
physically, mentally, and emotionally incapable of completing 
discovery by December 31, 1992, or completing preparations for 
trial by March 1, 1993. 
The district court never entered a ruling granting or 
denying Penney's Motion For Continuance & For Leave To Complete 
Discovery. Instead, the court entered on the same day February 
16, 1993, a MINUTE ENTRY granting defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment. Yet no mention is ever made of Penney's Motion For 
Continuance & For Leave To Complete Discovery in the court's 
43
 See Docketing Statement Addendum Exhibit "F" p. 6. 
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Minute Entries of 2/16/1993 or 2/18/1993, its Order of 3/9/1993 
or in its Judgment of 3/9/1993. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(f) allows a party 
defending against a summary judgment motion to complete or to 
conduct further discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment. 
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed as an abuse of discretion a trial courts grant of 
summary judgment because the party defending against the summary 
judgment motion had not been given an adequate opportunity to 
complete discovery. The Cox court quoted with approval the rule 
enunciated in Strand v. Associated Students of University of 
Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977), as follows: 
Where, however, the party opposing summary judgment 
timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating 
reasons why he is presently unable to proffer 
evidentiary affidavits he directly and forthrightly 
invokes the trial court's discretion. Unless dilatory 
or lacking in merit, the motion should be liberally 
treated. Exercising a sound discretion the trial 
court then determines whether the stated reasons are 
adequate. Id. at 194. 
In Cox, supra, the party defending against the summary 
judgment motion had timely initiated discovery proceedings but 
was never afforded an appropriate response. The record showed 
that the plaintiffs in Cox "initiated discovery to gather facts 
relative to the statements made in Stehl's affidavit, but were 
never answered by defendant as required under the rules of 
discovery." Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984). 
The Cox court also found that a party's failure to answer to 
discovery is also grounds to grant a party a motion for 
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continuance and for leave to complete discovery. Id. at 314.44 
See also Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 
1977) which held that, 
The granting of the motion for summary judgment was 
premature, because Kimball's discovery was not then 
complete. It was the information sought in the proceedings 
for discovery, which Kimball claimed would infuse the issues 
with facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment, and sustain his counter-claim. Whether that would 
be the case can not now be determined because such facts, if 
they exist, were not allowed to be discovered. Id. at 377. 
Like the party in Strand, Penney's case has been prejudiced 
because (a) he has not been adequate opportunity to complete 
discovery and (b) defendants have failed to respond to discovery. 
Penney's timely commencement. 
In 1990, promptly after commencement of this action, Penney 
served upon defendants PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS consisting of 87 separate 
detailed interrogatories and 31 detailed requests for production 
of documents consisting of 87 separate interrogatories.45. 
The FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS were prepared in substance and with sufficient 
detail that complete and honest responses to them would have 
provided Penney with much of the evidence necessary to both prove 
44
 See also Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 
1977) which held that the granting of the motion for summary judgment was 
premature, because Kimball's discovery was not then complete and because whether 
discovery would have provided Kimball with sufficient evidence to defeat summary 
judgment was now impossible to determine. 
See Addendum, Exhibit "A"« 
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his case and successfully defend Penney against any motion for 
summary judgment. 
Defendants' RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS were 
incomplete, misleading, not honest, and were of such an 
obstructionist nature that Penney found it necessary to serve 
upon defendants a motion to compel discovery, a second set of 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents, the 
additional taking of depositions of certain potential witnesses, 
and similar discovery-related activities. 
Additionally, Penney's former counsel on numerous occasions 
tried to schedule the depositions of defendants, but he was 
prevented from doing so by scheduling conflicts of defendants 
and/or their counsel.46 
Penney's illness. 
From the commencement of the lawsuit on June 15, 1990, 
Penney advised the trial court of his physical disabilities and 
of his diligent efforts to overcome said his limitations in order 
effectively and fully to participate in the discovery process. 
The trial court had been advised in writing by Penney that 
he was scheduled for mandatory back surgery on August 19, 1992, 
and that his recovery from the August 19, 1992, back surgery 
would be slow and painful and would - for its duration - greatly 
impair Penney's ability to complete his discovery and pre-trial 
motions by district court-imposed dates. 
46
 See R. 70-71 
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Penney's Pro Se status. 
The trial court was aware that Penney was greatly 
disadvantaged in his prosecution of this lawsuit in that he was 
forced to remove himself from Utah and to reside in Texas in 
order to receive necessary medical treatment, even though the 
trial court was in Utah, most of Penney's potential witnesses 
were in Utah, Penney's causes of action against the defendants 
had arisen in Utah during Penney's almost 6 years of employment 
there with defendant E-Systems. 
Penney's discovery was further limited when he was forced to 
represent himself PRO SE in the above action because of his 
financial distress and impoverishment caused by the combination 
of his ongoing medical treatment and the defendants7 illegally 
discharging Penney in a manner that left him devoid of any health 
or other insurance benefits. 
No prejudice to defendants. 
The trial court's reasonably extending the time for Penney 
to complete his discovery and his pre-trial motions would not 
have materially prejudiced any of the defendants, especially 
where the lawsuit was less than two and one-half (2 1/2) years 
old, having been commenced on June 15, 1990, the delays were 
caused in part because the actions of defendants had left Penney 
without any health, medical or other insurance and forced him to 
move to Texas where he could receive adequate medical treatment, 
and the probable witnesses and evidence were and would remain 
available for the reasonably foreseeable future. 
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In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 315 (Utah 1984), the court 
indicated Rule 56(f) motions for continuance and leave to 
complete discovery are denied generally where (a) the movant 
failed timely to utilize available discovery proceedings or (b) 
in order to thwart an attempted "fishing expedition" for purely 
speculative facts after substantial discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant evidence. 
Penney did not fail timely to utilize available discovery 
proceedings. He began his discovery in earnest in 1990 and 
proceeded as fast as he could limited only by the lack of 
cooperations by the defendants and Penney's own illness, 
surgeries and convalescence. Furthermore, Penney7s only purpose 
in discovery has been to gather the evidence needed to prove his 
case and not to engage in a "fishing expedition." 
The Cox court's conclusion is accurate and appropriate in 
Penney's case: 
Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion 
to grant defendant's motion. The [district] court 
should have ordered a continuance to permit discovery, 
or denied the motion for summary judgment, without 
prejudice to its renewal, after adequate time had 
elapsed in which plaintiff could have obtained the 
desired information. Id. at 315. 
VIII. Trial court erred in mandating that all discovery be 
completed by December 31, 1992. 
Penney advised the trial court - in writing - that he was 
scheduled for mandatory back surgery on August 19, 1992 as part 
of an ongoing medical treatment necessitated by the injuries he 
had sustained in a May 9, 1986 automobile accident. 
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Penney further advised the trial court that his recovery 
from the August 19, 1992, back surgery would be slow and painful. 
Therefore, Penney7s ability to complete his discovery and pre-
trial motions would be greatly impaired during the recuperation 
period. 
The trial court was aware that Penney was greatly 
disadvantaged in the prosecution of this lawsuit and that he was 
forced to move from Utah to Texas in order to receive the 
necessary medical treatment. Penney's move to Texas greatly 
hampered his ability to pursue his law suit, especially because 
the trial court was in Utah and most of Penney/s potential 
witnesses were in Utah. 
Penney was forced to represent himself PRO SE in the above 
action because of his financial distress and impoverishment 
caused by the combination of his ongoing medical treatment and 
the defendants' illegally discharging Penney in a manner that 
left him devoid of any health or other insurance benefits. 
The trial court's reasonably extending the time for Penney 
to complete his discovery and his pre-trial motions would not 
have materially prejudiced any of the defendants, especially 
where the lawsuit was less than two and one-half (2 1/2) years 
old, having been commenced on June 15, 1990. 
In fact, the delays in Penney's finishing his discovery were 
caused in part because the actions of defendants made it 
difficult, and in some cases impossible, to schedule a time to 
take their depositions. Penney, on the other hand, made himself 
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available to defendants and cooperated in their taking his 
deposition. 
He commenced discovery in a timely manner and might have 
finished it in a timely manner had defendants given more 
reasonable and complete answers to interrogatories, been more 
considerate in document production, and had made themselves 
readily available to the taking of depositions. 
Therefore, the trial court ought to have allowed Penney an 
extension of time to complete his discovery, rather than cutting 
it off in the middle of Penney7s recuperation from major surgery 
and at the sole completion of defendants7 discovery. 
IX. Trial court erred in concluding and ruling that Penney's 
Verified Complaint failed to state any claim for which 
relief could be granted. 
The instant brief and all other records before the court 
show that the Plaintiff, Penney, has stated numerous claims for 
which relief could be granted. The arguments and facts 
heretofore presented are sufficient to defeat any motion based on 
insufficiency of pleadings. 
In Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961), the court 
found that even though a complaint may not flawlessly state a 
particular cause of action, the facts - if sufficiently disclosed 
-could be found to fall within the requirements of sufficient 
pleadings. See also Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 1983). 
Penney's Verified Complaint not only states valid legal 
claims upon which relief may be granted, but also avers many 
pertinent facts that bolster the claims both express and implied. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons expressed in the preceding 
arguments, the court should reverse the trial court's ruling 
granting summary judgment. 
Penney sincerely believes that a primary motivating 
objective of E-Systems is to keep from the public and 
governmental scrutiny the embarrassing details of why Penney was 
wrongfully terminated. E-Systems has spared no expense in its 
all-out effort to achieve summary judgment rulings on all of 
Penney's causes of action. 
In the past, the court system has been generous in assisting 
PRO SE litigants so that each might have his or her day in court. 
Financially impoverished by the wrongful actions of a former 
employer, and physically disabled by serious long term injuries 
from an auto accident, Penney should not be precluded from the 
full benefit of the justice system. 
Viewing the facts of the case in a light most favorable to 
Penney, the court will agree that Penney not only deserves, but 
has a right to present his claims before a jury of his peers. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this CS\ Is day of June, 1993 if
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WILLIAM V. PENNEY 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
Appearing Pro Se 
